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Introductory remarks
In this chapter we will first give a brief historical overview of criminological research conducted in the framework of the United Nations. In a second part, we will highlight some of the comparative crime and justice statistics that were recently collected and published by the United Nations. Finally, we will discuss the challenges and prospects of comparative criminological research at the United Nations.
Intergovernmental process
Generalized statements are often made about "the United Nations" as if it were a single organization with a clear and stable structure, similar to a nation state or multinational company. In reality the UN can better be seen as a network of entities that compete with each other for funds and power in the political and bureaucratic playing field defined by the UN's Charter. Each little part of the UN has its own unique history, its own, everchanging constituency and its own professional culture.
A distinction must first be made between the United Nations as an inter-governmental body (diplomats reaching consensus decisions) and the United Nations as an international orgnanization (UN staff carrying out operational tasks). We will first focus our attention on the intergovernmental process. The intergovernmental bodies possess legislative powers and provide governance, including budget oversight and substantive guidance, to all activities of the UN. The highest political body is, of course, the General Assembly.
Other more specialized political bodies are the Security Council and the Council for Social and Economic Affairs (ECOSOC).
Since 9/11 the Security Council is heavily involved in the fight against terrorism, including its links with organized crime. Occasionally an interest has also been expressed in the security implications of markets in illegal drugs, eg in Afghanistan or Colombia. Traditionally crime issues are not considered from a security perspective and therefore rarily taken up by the Security Council.
The General Assembly deputes its work to six Committees, comparable to Parliamentary Commissions in Europe, eg Committees for Health, Agriculture or Home Affairs. Within the structure of the GA, there is no specialised committee on Justice Affairs. At the UN crime and drugs issues are dealt with by the Third Committee, the Committee for Social Humanitarian and Cultural Matters. Very few of the diplomats representing their countries in this Committee have any substantive knowledge of crime or criminal justice issues. In practice, the subject is seen as fair game for junior diplomats with a generalist outlook. Surprisingly, the Third Committee is not supposed to look at the budgetary aspects of the crime programme. Decisions on funding matters are the prerogative of the prestigious Fifth Committee.
To complicate matters further, governance over the UN crime programme is mainly exerted by another UN body, the Social and Economic Council. This Coucil was set up to prevent wars through development but has since been overshadowed by the World Bank and the IMF. One of ECOSOC's dozen 'functional commissions' is the Commission of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ). Another is the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Both commissions meet annually in Vienna for a week or more. Since 1991 the Crime Commision consists of representatives of fourty governments elected by the ECO-SOC. In principle this Commission supervises the crime programme, although is has, once again, no say over its financial resources. Before 1991 the Commission dealing with crime issues was mainly technically focussed. Delegations of countries consisted of experts elected by ECOSOC in their individual capacity. It was called the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control. Since then the debate in the new commission has gradually become more political and heads of delegations tend to be diplomats rather than experts from ministries of justice.
Traditionally, substantive guidance to the UN crime programme is also given by the quinquennial UN Congresses on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, formerly called Congresses on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders. These World Congresses, organized every five years since 1955, used to adopt resolutions on minimum standards and model treaties in the area of crime prevention and criminal justice that were subsequently endorsed by the ECOSOC or the GA, bypassing the Crime Commission, formerly Crime Committee. At the Congress in Cuba in 1990 several new standards and
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Jan van Dijk norms were adopted. In the aftermath of this Congress, Member States decided to put the Congresses fully under control of the intergovernmental process. Since 1991 Congresses report to the Crime Commission rather than to ECOSOC directly. The Congresses have lost their status as a quasi-legislative body.
The origins of the Committee go back to an international scholarly organization, the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation. This foundation tranfered most of its functions to the UN in the late 1940-ties. This historical background explains the professorial nature of the original commitee. It also explains why the UN Crime Programme in its early years bore the stamp of the New Movement for Social Defense and idealistically promoted scientifically based treatment of offenders. As mentioned, important changes in the governance structure of the UN crime programme were introduced in 1991. Based on deliberations at a special summit in Versailles in 1991 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on "Creation of an effective United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice programme". The crime programme was brought fully under the control of the intergovernmental process. In order to promote more operational activities a special Fund was established for the programme to allow Member States to make earmarked voluntary contributions. One the one had, the changes reflected the growing political importance of crime issues in the era of globalisation. They raised the expectation that the programme would be enabled to significantly expand its legislative, operational and analytical activities. On the other hand the changes marked the end of a venerable tradition of scholarly debates about crime and justice at the highest international level. The upgrading of the crime programme politically and institutionally has come at the price of reduced independence.
Around 1995 member states of the UN developed a growing interest in the elaboration of a UN Treaty against Transnational Organized Crime. The Crime Commission initiated negotiations on such Treaty which in record time resulted in the adoption by the GA on 15 November 2000 of a fully fledged UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and three supplementary protocols (dealing with trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants and production anf trafficking of illicit firearms respectively). Four years later the GA also adopted the UN Convention against Corruption.
Both UN Crime Conventions contain special articles obliging State Parties to collect and exchange scientific information on the types of criminality at issue as well as on measures of prevention and control. Article 28 of the UNTOC for example obliges State Parties "to consider developing and sharing analytical expertise concerning orgnanized criminal activities with each other and through international and regional organizations. For that purpose, common definitions, standards and methodologies should be developed and applied as appropriate". From a legal perspective the entry into force of these international legal instruments means that the UN crime programme has come of age. The crime programme is now firmly based on a set of focussed instruments of hard international law.
Both Conventions foresee the establishment of Conferences of State Parties to overlook implementation of Treaty provisions and to suggest possible revisions required. These Conferences operate independently of the existing Crime Commission and add yet another new element to the heavy governance of the crime programme. The Conventions also foresee the establishments of special funds for technical cooperation, including information exchange on transnational crime and corruption.
The Secretariat
In order to counterbalance the inertia of consensus-build intergovermental decision-making, the Charter of the United Nations has vested special powers in the UN Secretariat. Its head, the Secretary General, is elected by the GA for a term of five years. The UN Secretariat is funded from regular contributions from all member states according to a pro rata assessment based on national wealth.
In the course of the years fifty or more specialized agencies and programmes have been set up outside the core UN secretariat which together make up the "UN system". Examples are UNDP, WHO, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNAID and Habitat. Each of these organizations has entered into a special agreement with the UN and is funded independently from the regular budget. In Vienna the United Nations Drugs Control Programme was established in the late 80s to carry put operational functions mandated by the international drugs conventions.
In the absence of an UN Treaty on crime issues, other than the treaties on drugs control, there was till 2000 no legal mandate for a fully-fledged crime prevention programme. This explains why it was never decided to set up a specialized agency dealing with crime issues as was done for drugs control in the 1980ties. Funds of the UN's crime prevention programme continued to be derived from the regular budget of the UN Secretariat governed by the Fifth Committee in New York. Staff working on crime issues was initially concentrated in a small entity within the Division for Social Development in New York, called the Social Defense Section, later called the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch. It consisted of no more than a handfull of staff members.
In 1980 the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch was transferred to Vienna, the third capital of the UN, where it was positioned next to the much bigger United Nations International Drugs Control Programme (UNDCP). Substantive guidance was, as said, initially in the hands of a committee of internation experts rather than of government representatives. The focus of the Branch was the facilitation of drafting of international standards and norms by committed international legal scholars. Its mainly technical orientation and its lack of an operational component explains its comparatively strong focus on criminological work. Over the years the Branch managed to preserve some elements of the programme's academic heritage and maintained excellent contacts with representatives of the academic community. 
Criminological research agenda's of the UN
Now that we have sketched the evolving politico-institutional context of the UN's work on crime and criminal justice we will 'zoom in' on the contents and prospects of its criminological research agenda.
As said, a first UN Congress on crime issues was convened in 1955. The first quinquennial congresses set the scene for important international debates on major trends in penal reform. During the existence of UNCICP analytical work formed an integral part of operational projects on transational crime issues. In the few years of its existence CICP staff worked on the collection of information on organized crime groups (Van Dijk, Shaw, Buscaglia, 2002) . In collaboration with UNICRI, assessments were made of corruption and human trafficking problems in several developing and transitional countries. Global databases were set up on incidents of terrorism (Alex Schmid) and human trafficking respectively (Kangaspunta, 2002) . In 1999 UNCICP also launched its own academic Journal, FORUM on Crime and Society edited by Jan van Dijk and Vincenzo Ruggiero (professor of criminology at Middlesex University), published in the six UN languages (English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Russian and Chinese).
Although the Social Defense movement and the human rights movement provided broad filosophical guidance to the Secretariats papers, it is difficult to discern a distinct criminological research tradition with its own methodological or theoretical features in the UN crime programme. The reports produced by the Crime Branch and later by UNICRI and UNCICP can best be characterized as eclectic. They by and large reflected the prevailing criminological agendas of the day. A constant feature in the UN's criminological research agenda, however, seems the search for comparable international indicators of crime and justice. In my view this comparative statistical work constitutes, in spite of its many methodological problems, the most important contribution of the UN crime programme to international criminology.
The United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems
One of the first tasks assigned to the small crime unit within the UN Secretariat was the collection of statistics on crime. As early as April 1948 the Social Commission, forerunner of the Economic and Social Council, requested the secretariat to undertake a study of the impact of the Second World War on levels of crime. A ques-
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Jan van Dijk tionnaire requesting official statistics on crimes recorded by the police and convictions for the period from 1937 to 1946 was sent to the Member States (UNCJIN Crime and Justice Letter, 1997) . The lack of comparability of the fragmented data submitted precluded specific conclusions other than that in most countries recorded crime had been on the increase, especially in the countries that had taken part in the war.
After a failed first attempt in 1974, the Secretariat sent out a detailed questionnaire on comparable cross-national crime and criminal justice statistics in 1976/1977. This study is regarded as the first UN Crime Survey. In response to a working paper of the secretariat containing some results, the Sixth UN Crime Congress of 1980 requested further work on the survey. During two Expert Group Meetings, hosted by Rutgers University and Sam Houston University in the USA, a new questionnaire was designed with an enlarged focus on the operations of the criminal justice system. The resulting revised questionnaire was distributed in 1983 and this sweep is regarded as the second UN Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (crime surveys for short).
The Secretariat duly reported on key results of the second and third surveys in working papers for the Congresses in 1985 (Milan) and 1990 (Cuba). To prevent criticisms from individual countries data were typically published at the regional level only.
In 1990 the ECOSOC recommended streamlining of the questionnaire and execution at shorter intervals than five years. The reformed Crime Commission which replaced the old Committee, adopted several resolutions requesting further work of the Secretariat on the surveys along these lines. The questionnaire was indeed somewhat curtailed but at the same time extended with new questions on transnational crime. Reports on the fourth survey were submitted to the 1995 Congress in Cairo. Data on Europe and North America were presented in more detail-and after additional quality checks -by HEUNI in 1995 (Kangaspunta 1995) .
Work on the fifth crime survey was much delayed. The expectation that the new crime prevention programme adopted at the Versailles summit of 1990 would result in more generous funding from key member states, including for analytical work, had not materialized. The Crime Branch although endowed with a broader mandate, continued to be handicapped by a chronic lack of resources. New results of the surveys were not published before 1999. They were included in the Global Report on Crime and Justice, produced by Oxford University Press for UNCICP (Newman 1999).
In the meantime the questionnaire had been further curtailed at Expert Group Meetings in Buenos Aires (1997) and in Veldhoven, The Netherlands (1998). At those meetings, it was concluded that the collection of data on organized crime required new methodologies that were not feasible in the framework of the UN crime survey. In 1999 the sixth survey went into the field with a questionnaire that had been reduced by half. Since then the surveys have been executed in 2001, 2003 and 2005. Response rates in the latter surveys have fluctuated around 70-80 countries, mainly from the Western group.
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Since 2000 results of the survey are made available electronically on the website of UNCICP (later UNODC). This has greatly improved their accessibility. The results of the crime surveys belong to the most frequently visited parts of this website. Results were also published in reports to the 2000 Crime Congress in Vienna and subsequently in the newly established journal FORUM on Crime and Society (Shaw, Van Dijk, Rhomberg 2003) .
The International Crime Victims Survey
One of the most important and most frequently cited shortcomings of the UN Crime Survey is that figures of crimes recorded by the police cannot be reliably used as a measure of the level of crime, especially not for comparative purposes across countries. Rates of crimes recorded in police administrations are determined by domestic criminal legislation, public reporting of crimes and the capacity and willingness of the police to make official records of such reports. As a general rule, rates of crimes recorded per 100.000 inhabitants tend to be the highest in the most affluent countries, eg New Zealand, Sweden and Denmark and the lowest in developing or transitional countries. These rankings do not reflect the distribution of the volume of crime as experienced by the public. Rates of police-recorded crimes should be seen as indicators of the effectiveness of law enforcement rather than of levels of crime.
Since 1990 the Crime Branch, later UNCICP, has urged for due caution when using rates of recorded crimes as a measure of crime. Publications on comparative crime rates often focussed on rates of homicides since these are generally seen as less affected by varying reporting and recording patterns (Rubin,Walker 2004) . For similar reasons INTERPOL decided in 2004 to discontinue its well-known series of international statistics of police-recorded crimes. Rates of recorded crimes had lost their credibility for comparative purposes.
Over the past three decades more and more countries have started to conduct sample surveys among the general population on experiences with crime as an alternative source of information about crime to what the police themselves record. Such victimization surveys provide important additional information on crime as experienced by the public, rates of reporting crimes to the police, experiences of victims with the police, fear of crime and the use of crime prevention measures. If the research methodology used is standardised, the surveys also offer a new opportunity for the collection of crime statistics, which can be used for comparative purposes (Alvazzi del Frate, Zvekic, Van Dijk 1993 In addition new data were presented on non-conventional types of crime such as corruption and organized crime drawn from surveys among business executives about perceived risks for their companies. The report was subsequently also distibuted among attendants of the 14th Crime Commission in Vienna. An extended and revised version of some of its chapters was later published Van Dijk (2007). The next paragraph will highlight some of the key results.
3
A sample of international crime statistics
Levels of volume crime
The ICVS interviews samples of households about their recent experiences with the most frequently occurring types of conventional crime (volume crime). National samples include at least 2,000 respondents who are generally interviewed with the CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interview) technique. In the countries where this method is not applicable because of insufficient distribution of telephones, face-
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Jan van Dijk to-face interviews are conducted in the main cities, generally with samples of 1,000-1,500 respondents.
The ICVS provides an overall measure of victimisation in the previous year by any of the ten "conventional" crimes included in the questionnaire. Among the eleven "conventional" crimes, some are "household crimes", i.e. those which can be seen as affecting the household at large, and respondents report on all incidents known to them. A first group of crimes deals with the vehicles owned by the respondent or his/her household. A second group refers to break and enter (burglaries) and a third group of crimes refers to victimization experienced by the respondent personally, including robbery, pickpocketing, assault and sexual offences.
The results of the ICVS 1996 -2005 show that on average one in four citizens (25 %) living in urban areas suffered at least one form of victimization over the twelve months preceding the interview. This result confirms that real levels of crime are several times larger than those recorded by the police because of non-reporting by victims or non-recording by the police. In selected Western countries analyses have shown real crime to be four to five times larger than police-recorded crime, especially violent and sexual crime. The gap between actual and recorded crime is much larger in developing countries since reporting and recording rates are considerably lower as discussed in the previous chapter. Globally, the number of real volume crimes committed can be roughly estimated as at least ten times higher than those recorded. Global recorded crime can rightly be described as just the tip of the iceberg.
Regional rates do not differ more than ten percentage points from the global average. Victimization rates are highest for city dwellers in Latin America (34 %) and Africa (33 %) and lowest in Asia (21 %). Variation in over all victimization among regions mainly consisting of developed countries is minimal.
It is noteworthy that the variation in regional rates does not fully conform to the commonly held notion that levels of crime are driven by poverty. The low crime rate of Asia is clearly at odds with this notion. The rate of the Eastern European countries below that of Central and Western Europe also belies easy generalizations about the relationships between poverty and crime. Figure 1 shows regional distribution of one year victimisation rates for ten crimes as observed in the ICVS. The ICVS defines burglary as house-breaking for purposes of theft. Robbery is defined as theft from the person by use of force, thus involving direct contact between victim and offender ("contact" crime). Rates for all types of crimes refer to percentages of persons victimized at least once by any of ten crimes in the course of last year.
The differences among the regions were larger for the two crimes involving property, which were by far the highest in Africa and Latin America. Burglary in Africa was four times more frequent than in Western Europe. Robbery in Latin America was eight times higher than in Western Europe, North America and Australia. Contrary to a common perception, rates of burglary as well as of robbery and assault/threats are not higher in the USA than in most parts of Western Europe. In fact USA rates are significantly lower than those of, for example, England and Wales and The
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Netherlands. The data in respect of robbery confirm the validity of the concern about urban violence in several main cities in Latin America and Africa, including in some of the newly established democracies such as South Africa (Shaw, Van Dijk, Rhomberg 2003) .
The crime category of assault and threat is defined in the ICVS as personal attacks or threats, either by a stranger or a relative or friend, without the purpose of stealing. It is another "contact" crime and although physical consequences may be minor in most cases, it may well have important emotional repercussions for victims. Assault on women are more likely to be domestic in nature than assault on men. In a third of the cases of violence against women, the offender was known at least by name to the victim. In one of five of the cases the crime was committed in the victim's own house. The level of violence against women is inversely related to the position of women in society, with developing countries showing much higher rates (Alvazzi del Frate, Patrignani 1995). Table 1 shows the ranking of countries on the basis of one-year overall victimization rates, based on results of ICVS surveys carried out in the period 1996-2005. For a few countries which did not participate in these three rounds of the ICVS, rates from the 1992 survey were added (their country names are printed in italics) 1 .
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1 In interpreting country rates, it must be borne in mind that they are based on relatively small samples with an average size of 1,000 respondents. The actual rates among the population may deviate from the ones given here. As a general rule there is a less than 10 % chance that Jan van Dijk ICVS 1996 ICVS -2005 The countries with the highest prevalence rates for conventional crime are mainly from Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of Mongolia, Cambodia and Estonia. A high prevalence rate was also found in Papua New Guinea (not included).
Countries of Europe and North America are almost without exception situated in the middle category. Contrary to common perception, overall rates of volume crimesuch as burglary, robbery and assault/threats -are not higher in the USA than in most parts of Western Europe. In fact USA rates are significantly lower than those of, for example, England and Wales and France. The overall rate of Canada is somewhat below the mean of the European Union and that of the United States of America.
Countries with the lowest rates form a fairly mixed group with a strong representation of Eastern European and of both affluent Asian countries (Japan, South Korea), middle-income ones (China) and poor ones (Philippines, Indonesia). Switzerland, although less so than in the first round of the ICVS, is still qualified as one of the countries with the safest cities in Western Europe.
238 the overall victimization rates of the population deviate more than three percent points from the rates of the samples. Individual country rates, then, cannot be seen as exactly right. They provide a reliable indicator of which countries have relatively high, moderately high, or relatively low rates of victimization. 
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Internationale Probleme
Homicide rates
For obvious reasons, data on completed homicide are not available through victim surveys. Fortunately homicide represents one of the few types of crime for which data from police and health administrations are available which can be used for tentative comparisons at the international level. This is due to a relatively uniform definition and to relatively high reporting and recording rates across all countries (Zimring, Hawkins 1997) .
Statistics on police-recorded homicides are recorded through the United Nations Crime Surveys, the latest covering 2000 up to 2002. The other main source of information are the health statistics collected by the World Health Organization through hospital surveys (WHO, 2002) . The WHO statistics reflect the views of medical doctors on the causes of death of hospitalized patients and are independent from police administrations. Comparisons of the country rates according to the UN Surveys and the WHO revealed a reasonable degree of agreement (Rubin, Walker 2004) . However, an analysis of rates over a 16-year period, showed WHO rates to be on average 15 percent higher (Shaw, Van Dijk, Rhomberg 2003) . The explanation for this higher count of the WHO might be that hospitals classify as homicides cases of assault resulting in death -whereby the perpetrator did not intend to apply lethal force. Further analysis revealed that the higher counts of WHO do not occur in developed countries. The discrepancies are limited to middle-income countries (WHO 19 % higher) and developing countries (WHO 45 % higher). The latter finding suggest that the main reason for the differences is that in developing countries even for as serious a crime as homicide a significant proportion of crimes committed is never reported to the police or never recorded (see also Altbeker 2005).
The United Nations surveys show a global average of 7 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants per year in recent years. The WHO counted for the year 2000 over half a million homicide-related deaths or 8.8 per 100,000. Males account for 77 % of all homicides and have rates that are three times those of females (13.6 and 4 respectively). The highest rates are found among males aged 15-29 years (19.4 per 100.000).
For the purpose of this publication, the latest available national homicide rates were taken from the sixth, seventh and eighth UN surveys, covering the period 1990 to 2002 (most rates relate to 1998 to 2002). To increase coverage of countries, data was added from the WHO dataset for twelve countries not participating in any of the UN surveys. In the cases where these were rates of middle or lower income countries,
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Jan van Dijk statistical adjustments were made to achieve better comparability with the UN rates. Through this procedure homicide rates could be calculated for 111 countries.
Figure 2 shows regional rates for completed homicides.
Homicide rates are highest in Southern Africa, which in this respect is in a category of its own with rates above 30 per 100,000 population or three times the world average. Southern Africa is followed by Central America, South America, the Caribbean and Eastern Europe, while other regions show much lower rates.
The lowest levels reported were in North Africa, Middle-East/South-West Asia, West and Central Europe and East and South East Asia. Homicide rates in North Africa appear to be the lowest on earth with many countries maintaining rates below 1 per 100,000 inhabitants (see for details below). Apart from North Africa, such low rates can only be found in some parts of Western Europe.
The differences between different parts of the Western world are particularly noteworthy. North America, here represented by the USA and Canada, stands out with higher rates than both Western Europe and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). In terms of homicides Canada is more similar to Western Europe than to its Southern neighbors. If Mexico were included in the rates for North America the regional rate would be even higher.
Eastern Europe contrasts starkly with Western Europe, with countries such as Russia (19, 8) showing extremely high rates. High homicide rates in the former Soviet countries have also been observed in previous statistical overviews (Aromaa, et al 2003) . Previous analyses of data from Europe and North America have shown that the levels of various forms of violence are correlated, although not strongly (Van Dijk 1999) . The high homicide rates observed in (subsaharan) Africa and the Americas are accompanied by high levels of robberies, assaults and sexual assaults.
Country rates for homicides are collected through the UN crime trends survey, supplemented by data from the WHO report on Health and Violence (WHO, 2002) . Table 2 shows results. 
Diagnosing organised crime with the use of markers
According to common definitions of organized crime in criminological literature (Kenney, Finckenhauer 1995; Levi 2002 ) defining traits of organized crime are the use of extreme violence, corruption of public officials, including law enforcement and judicial officers, penetration of the legitimate economy (eg through money-laundering) and interference in the political process. These elements are not only incorporat-
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Jan van Dijk ed in national anti-mafia laws in some countries, including the USA and Italy (Fijnaut., Paoli 2004) but also used as operational definitions by the European police community through the socalled Falcone checklist (Levi 2002) .
If comparing official police-based information on garden variety crimes as burglary or street robbery seems no longer feasible, there is little hope for optimism regarding the comparison of police-based information on more complex crimes. At the global level it is to be expected that the number of police-recorded cases of organized crime correlates inversely with the seriousness of the problem. Where organized crime rules, few of such cases will ever be investigated, let alone brought before a court. Statistics on drug seizures can illustrate the point. Seizures of drugs by police or custom authorities of a country are likely to reflect law enforcement priorities and professional capacities rather than the global flow of drugs.
As shown in the previous chapters, the level of conventional crime can be successfully estimated through the administering of standardized victimization surveys among the public or samples of business executives. Through direct contacting of key groups of the public, bypassing the domestic legal institutions, at least some of the methodological problems can be avoided. There seems to be no a priori reasons why the same approach could not be followed to estimate the extent of organized crime in a country, for example by interviewing business executives, the key target group of racketeering and extortion, one of the most important manifestations of local organized crime in many countries.
Since 1997 the World Economic Forum has carried out surveys among CEO's of larger companies to identify obstacles to businesses in an increasing number of countries, reaching a total of 102 in 2003. From the onset, one of the questions in these 'executives opinion surveys' asked about the prevalence in the country of 'mafiaoriented racketeering, extortion (imposes or not serious costs on businesses)'.
An analysis was conducted of the patterns of answers given to this question on perceived mafia prevalence from the seven annual rounds of WEF surveys conducted since 1997. To further reduce sampling error, the scores of the surveys were averaged. The resulting mean scores are based on sample sizes of 500 and over for each country. They reflect the perceived prevalence of organized crime in the period 1997 to 2003 according to business executives.
In order to facilitate further statistical exploration, a composite index was constructed based on the averaged rankings of countries on the WEF surveys of 1997 to 2003 and the assessments of organized crime prevalence of an international risk assesment group (MIG), covering a total of 156 countries. For an explanation of the methodology of the index please see Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003) and Van Dijk (2006) . This socalled Organized Crime Perception Index (OCPI) refers to the level of different types of organized crime activities such as extortion and drugs, arms and people trafficking as perceived by potential victim groups and experts. The widespread perception among key persons that such activities are rampant in a country provides by itself no proof that this is actually the case, but it provides ground for further enquiries. It can be regarded as a first "marker" of organised crime presence.
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As mentioned above, instrumental violence corruption of public officials and moneylaundering are regarded as universal secondary characteristics of organized crime. It is hard to imagine a high level of organized crime in a country without a significant amount of these three systemic mafia-related phenomena. Lethal violence, for example, is not by itself a unique characteristic of organized crime. Nor is the absence of such violence by itself evidence that organised crime is non-existent on the territory. However, a high prevalence of 'killings' in a country can be used a 'marker' of mafia-type criminal activity. Where homicide rates are high, organised crime activity is likely to be significant and vice versa.
Statistical indicators were selected for the prevalence of each of the three defining systemic characteristics or "markers" of organized crime activity in countries: instrumental violence, high-level corruption and money-laundering. As a fourth marker we included an indicator of the size of the black market. In an attempt to develop a proxy measure of 'mob-related violence', rates were calculated of the number of police-recorded homicides per country minus the number of convictions for homicide. Both types of data were drawn from the latest UN Crime and Criminal Justice Surveys. The resulting rates of 'unsolved homicides' was used as proxy indicator of 'mob-related homicide'. Similarly a proxy indicator of 'high level corruption'' was derived from studies of the World Bank Institute (Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi 2003) . Indicators of money-laundering and the extent of the black economy were taken from the World Economic Forum reports (WEF 2003; .
The organized crime perception index was found to be fairly strongly or strongly correlated with the four other indicators of secondary manifestations of organized crime (with correlation coefficient of .50 or more). The high degree of correlation justified the construction of a composite organized crime index combining the five interrelated indicators. An important strategic advantage of the composite index is the incorporation of at least one objective measure of organized crime activity, the rate of unsolved homicides according to official administrations. Scores on this composite index cannot be dismissed by governments as being based on 'just perceptions'. The scores are corroborated by the official 'body counts' of their own police authorities as reported to the United Nations through the Crime Surveys. Table 3 depicts the regional distribution on the Composite Organized Crime Index. For diagnostic purposes, the picture also presents both the exact scores on the composite index and on its five source indicators.
Country scores
The combination of data from different sources allows the calculation of scores for a large number of countries.. To facilitate assessments of the organized crime situation of countries both the scores and the rank numbers for each of the indicators/markers are included. In most cases the rank numbers for different indicators are in the same range. Deviations of single indicators can point to specific features of organized crime or to deficiencies in some of the measures. In both cases further research is indicated. In some cases the diagnosis can only be very tentative due to lack of sufficient information.
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Within Europe organized crime prevalence increases diagonally from the North West to the South East, with levels being low in England and Germany, higher in Spain and Italy and by far the highest in Russia, Albania and Ukraine.
The country rates should not be taken at face value but be used as a basis for further diagnostic enquiries. In Asia rates are the worst in parts of South Asia (Pakistan, Bangladesh). But also the emerging superpowers, China and India, are rated above Italy on this composite index. In the international literature on organized crime India is rarily the focus of attention. Perhaps this is an oversight. Research on Chinese organized crime is mainly foussed on Chinese expatriates. Limited available research findings on homeland China point to collusion between corrupt communist party members and local gangs in remote areas (Zhang 2002) . More research on the role of the organized crime-corruption in these two countries seems fully warranted because it may have serious negative implications for their development potential.
In Africa, Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique stand out with the highest scores. Nigerian organized crime activity in both the country and the region has been welldocumented (Shaw 2002; UNODC 2005) . A detailed account of how organized crime threatens to penetrate state and businesses in Southern Africa, notably in Mozambique, is given in Gastrow (2003) . In Latin America Haiti, Paragua, Guatamala, Venezuela and Colombia show the highest scores. High scores are also observed in Jamaica.
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Jan van Dijk The world map of organized crime emerging from this index differs fundamentally from that of conventional crimes. The perceived prevalence of organized crime and the overall ICVS rates of victimization by volume crime was found to be unrelated (r = 0.15, n.s. (Adler 1983) . It is worth noting here that her original work included a description of seven high crime countries as well. This darker flipside of the study had to be dropped because of political opposition of the countries involved. Another, more recent example of repressed knowledge on crime in a comparative perspective is a UNDP sponsored book on the illegal drugs industry in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. In order not to embarrass the current administrations of these countries with references to historical illegal drugs industries and drugs-related corruption, the UNDP Office stopped the publication of the planned publication (Thoumi 2002) . At the Tenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2000 in Vienna a backroom paper was distributed by the Centre of International Crime Prevention with an overview of international statistics on crime and corruption based on survey research. among the public. The paper had to be withdrawn at the urgent request of representatives of a Latin American country featuring at the top for some of the rankings. Many more examples of political interference in the production of such statistics can be given (Van Dijk 2007).
ing bodies. The launch of a new crime programme in 1991 and the more recent merger with the drugs programme have not eliminated this key impediment. In the current situation resources available for the production and analysis of crime statistics at UNODC are still minimal. More professional staff is available at UNICRI but its donors have so far shown little interest in funding comparative research. If Member States are interested in fact-based discussions on global crime issues, a reasonable budget for the collection of international crime and justice statistics should somehow be secured. Since such funds are unlikely to be allotted from the regular budget of the UN, they should be made available through voluntary contributions to the Crime Fund by a group of donor countries and/or private donors.
A second consideration concerns the political sensitivity of any comparative data on crime and justice. As recommended by the 2006 Expert Group, administrative statistics collected through the regular UN Crime Surveys must be supplemented by data collected through surveys among the public and the business sector. Such external data are bound to be met with opposition from countries that are portrayed in a less favourable light. This is especially likely to happen with data on corruption and organized crime. Most international statistics collected by the UN are based on official data submitted by the Member States themselves. This is typically the case with economic and health statistics and also with statistics on drugs seizures. It is unusual for UN agencies other than socalled Special Rapporteurs, to publish data that have been collected independently from the member states. The inevitable use of non-official data in a World Crime Report makes the preparation of such report a politically sensitive undertaking.
To prevent undue political interference with the production and analysis of such data, institutional arrangements must be put in place that can assure the independence of the work. In our view the Executive Board of UNICRI, consisting of individual experts elected by ECOSOC, is ideally placed to take upon itself the role of steering committee of a future World Crime Report. The UNICRI Board seems the torch-bearer of the venerable UN tradition of unpoliticed reflection on crime and justice issues dating from the 1950 and 1960ties. For the production of credible international statistics on crime and justice the existence of an institutional shield against undue interference seems indispensable. The ideal scenario would be that both the Crime Commission and the Conference of State Parties of UNTOC and the UN-CAC request UNICRI to initiate work on the development of comparable indicators of crime, including organized crime/corruption and its counter measures. At the same time, efforts should be made to raise funds of 0,5 million euro or more for five years as a minimum. The implementation of such global crime indicators programme should partly be outsourced to institutes of the programme Network of Institutes such as ILANUD and UNAFRI. If, and only if, such scenario would unfold, the prospects for the UN collecting a new generation of international crime statistics look favorable.
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In conclusion
Those convinced of the utility of collecting and analyzing comparative crime statistics for political and academic reasons, find themselves in a quandary. Because of the intrinsic opposition of many governments, the production of international crime statistics is chronically underfunded. As a result, the case for such statistics must be made on the basis of fragmentary, dated and in some respects flawed statistics. Anyone publishing such data can count on close scrutiny of their methodological soundness and, if any flaws are detected, on stridently critical reviews. In this situation, many experts are inclined to stay on the scientifically safe side: the few available international crime statistics are presented to illustrate their methodological weakness rather than their potential to inform policy making and advance grounded theories of crime.
From a scientific perspective such a cautious approach might be commendable. But as Aebi, Killias, and Tavares (2003) rightly point out, it plays in the hands of those who prefer such information not to be, or ever become, available for self serving, political reasons. It means capitulating to political forces that would prefer comparative criminology to remain 'statistically challenged' for ever. In our opinion, the time has come to break the politically imposed omerta of criminologists on comparative crime and justice. The new generation of criminologists are well-travelled and intellectually more internationally oriented than in the past. They will hopefully revolt against the conspicuous absence of a steady flow of credible statistics in their chosen field of study. The collection and dissemination of such statistics seems a worthy goal for the United Nations to pursue.
